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Summary The closing of World War II provoked new questions regarding ethnic belonging and identity for
Japanese Americans. In this article, ruptures around race, ownership and geography in the politics of
remembering the atomic bomb are explored through a description of the specific narratives constructed by
Japan and the US, and 1945 Nikkei reactions to the Atomic bombing. Through this examination, the role of
discourse in the formation of private and public memory is clarified, as is the relationship between local,
national, and trans-national memory.
Introduction
Early Japanese American History is increasingly
being conceptualized within trans-national frames and
locations. In many ways it is a history of border
ambiguity and crossings. In this essay I examine the
discourse construction of atomic memory in Japan and
the United States calling attention to stories of
Japanese Americans that fall in between and cause
fissures in these borders of thinking.
It is estimated that in 1941, 30,000 American born
Nikkei were temporarily residing in Japan.1) This is a
significant number considering that in that same year
only 80,000 Nisei were estimated to be living on the
US mainland and a far smaller number in Hawaiʼi.2)
Of those, upwards of 4,800 were living in Hiroshima
and an unknown number were living in Nagasaki.
During this time tensions between the US and Japan
had been building up to Pearl Harbor and the
declaration of war. In August of 1941, passage from
Japan back to the US was suspended and many of those
Nikkei found themselves ʻtrappedʼ in Japan. A great
number of those temporarily residing in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki perished, but it is estimated that upwards of
1,000 survived and repatriated to the United States.
Furthermore, tracing early Japanese American immi-
gration history reveals that a disproportionate number
of early Japanese immigrants to the United State
emigrated from Hiroshima prefecture.3) According to
a 1960 census by the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu
roughly a quarter of the Nikkei living in Hawaii came
from Hiroshima.4) Thus, many Japanese Americans
had immediate family living in or close relational ties
to Hiroshima during the time of the bombing, leading
me to suggest that agency, erasures, appropriation and
commodification in the discourse surrounding stories
of the atomic bomb have far greater implications for
Japanese American history and identity than previ-
ously explored or understood.
Japanese Americansʼ positionality leading up to and
during World War II regarding their relationship(s) to
both the United States as the land of their birth and to
Japan as the land of their ancestors placed them in a
difficult position throughout the war,5) with their
loyalty constantly called into question.6) Historically,
citizenship and rights were not guaranteed to Japanese.
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Pre-war immigration policy provides one lens for
situating historical subjectivity and racial tensions
concerning Japanese Americans. The 1907-1908
Gentlemanʼs Agreement curbed emigration from
Japan, Californiaʼs Alien Land Law Passed in 1913
prohibited (primarily) Chinese and Japanese “aliens”
from owning land, and the immigration act of 1917
restricted Asian immigration into the United States.
Juxtaposed against these laws, there emerged a
growing permanent settlement, leading to the buildup
of an ethnic enclave and the creation of Japanese
American institutions such as schools, places of
worship, and a Nikkei press. In 1922 in Ozawa v. the
United States the Supreme Court ruled that Japanese
immigrants were ineligible for citizenship/naturaliza-
tion rights, and in the same year the passing of the
Cable Act effected that any “American” woman who
married an “Asian” would lose her citizenship.
Finally, the 1924 Oriental Exclusion Act combined
with the formula used in the1924 National Origins Act
barred all Asian immigration.7) In addition to these
laws, during World War II, mainland folks of Japanese
ancestry were incarcerated as a group, without trial,
and without regard for their individual civil rights.8) In
1943, the federal government created a racially
segregated U. S. Army unit for Japanese Americans
and subjected residents in the camps to a loyalty
questionnaire. Question 27 and 28 of the question-
naire became the main focus of concern. One of the
questions asked if the respondent was willing to serve
in the US armed forces in combat duty9), and the other
asked :
Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the
United States of America and faithfully defend
the United States from any and all attack by
foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form
of allegiance to the Japanese Emperor or any
other foreign government, power, or organi-
zation?10)
Christian Heimburger describes well the irony of these
questions, “one asked citizens who had been forcibly
imprisoned to serve their country in combat, and the
other had the potential to render the “alien” Issei
effectively stateless.”11) Most “no-no” respondents
were separated and moved to the Tule Lake camp, and
some were even deported, while most “yes-yes”
respondents were allowed to leave the camps.
The postwar myths of the war experience12) only
added to the marginalization of the Japanese American
experience. Furthermore, as I intend to argue, because
the story of the atomic bomb has never been properly
placed in the canon of Japanese American history it
continues to cast a shadow on Japanese American
identity. Foucaultʼs widely explored theories on the
presence of power in discourse formation are useful in
understanding the multiple subjectivities of Japanese
Americans in remembering the bomb. Foucault
explains that :
There is no binary division to be made between
what one says and what one does not say ; we
must try to determine the different ways of not
saying such things, how those who can and those
who cannot speak of them are distributed, which
type of discourse is authorized, or which form of
discretion is re­quired in either case. There is
not one but many silences, and they are an
integral part of the strategies that underlie and
permeate discourses.13)
In reflecting on the production of narratives equating
the dropping of the bomb with peace, the saving of
lives and the end of the war, it becomes apparent how
the agency for remembering the bomb in Japanese
America was obscured in historical, political and racial
ways. Mainland Nikkei had experienced imprison-
ment in concentration camps for their contested loyalty
based on their Japanese heritage. They also experi-
enced what I would like to call a symbolic loss of
homeland with the atomic bombing of Japan.
Therefore it becomes necessary to analyze the
divergent narratives and to trace their continuities and
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discontinuities in the Japanese American memory of
the atomic bomb.
Atomic Bomb=Peace=Anti-war : Tracing the
Peace Industry and the Japanese Mythology
Yoshikuni Igarashi has argued that Japan was able to
survive its WWII defeat by “reinventing itself as a
peaceful nation,”14) an idea that has been advanced by
other scholars who have demonstrated how Japanese
post-war modernity is linked to the construction of a
narrative of Japanese collective national victimhood.
Lisa Yoneyama, for example, demonstrates how
Japanʼs war crimes become invisible behind its status
of being the “only atom-bombed nation” in the
world.15) Kyoko Doi has called the discourse on
Hiroshima (in Japan *emphasis added) formulaic,
“Hiroshima=atomic bomb=peace=antiwar,”16) and ar-
gues that it has been strategically produced, distrib-
uted, and consumed.
The formula described by Doi is useful in critiquing
the evolution and universalization of nuclear politics
specific to Hiroshima. Doi explains that this formula
was not a natural conclusion reached in the aftermath
of nuclear devastation, but rather a calculated strategy
of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction
Law.17) Enacted in 1949, on the fourth anniversary of
the atomic bombing, the lawʼs first article establishes
its aim to be : “the construction of the city of
Hiroshima as a peace memorial city to symbolize the
human ideal of sincere pursuit of genuine and lasting
peace.”18) Under this law reconstruction projects that
were mired by Hiroshimaʼs financial scarcity received
preferential assistance from the Japanese national
government, specifically Hiroshima was granted
money and property previously belonging to the
military.19) Doi argues that “peace was not accompa-
nied by a noble aim, but rather it was a slogan used to
get funding for post-war reconstruction of the city.”20)
This commodification has had several unfortunate
consequences of concern to the critical politics for the
nation. On the one hand, as Yoneyama, Doi and others
point out, this commodification of peace in the
Hiroshima story has functioned to hide the reality of
the pre-war Japanese empire, its colonial practices and
consequences. John Dower deduced that “Hiroshima
and Nagasaki became icons of Japanese suffering-
perverse national treasures, of a sort, capable of fixing
Japanese memory of the war on what had happened to
Japan and simultaneously blotting out recollection of
the Japanese victimization of others.”21) In particular
the treatment of Koreans22) and “comfort women”23)
has been a major focus of contention in debates bound
by the victim-perpetrator binary of the official
Japanese peace narrative. Japanʼs refusal to apologize
or take full responsibility for its war crimes continues
to be a subject of contemporary political contention in
the country. And on the other hand, the critical politics
in the work of Japanese peace/anti-war/anti-imperial
movement (s) and their history has been quite
unfortunately obfuscated and distorted by government
manipulation in the production of the national master
narrative and the development of what could be
dubbed as a “Peace Industrial Complex.”
Atomic Nationalism : Zaigai (Foreign)
Hibakusha Excluded from Memory
According to the inscription of the Korean Victims
Memorial at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park,
there were approximately 100, 000 Korean citizens,
soldiers, civilian employees of the Japanese army, and
mobilized students living in Hiroshima by the end of
World War II. It states that of the approximately 200,
000 lives taken by the atomic bomb, an estimated ten
percent were Korean.24) Lisa Yoneyamaʼs critical
discussion regarding Korean hibakusha brings into
focus the ethnic nationalism in Hiroshimaʼs narrative.
It calls attention to a vagueness in the estimates of
Korean atomic bomb casualties, ranging from five to
fifty thousand, which she says is “evidence that the
bombʼs impact on the racially and ethnically minori-
tized population has been considerably neglected.”25)
Yoneyama also demonstrates how the Korean
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Hibakusha Memorial erected in 1970, and the different
controversies that it has embodied have served as an
important space for disrupting the purity of a
“Japanese” victimhood in the Hiroshima memory.
The inscription on the plaque remembering Korean
victims mentioned above is perhaps the most succinct
summary for understanding the socio-historical politics
concerning Korean ethnicity in Japan and the atomic
bomb so Iʼd like to print the rest here. It reads :
The Korean victims were given no funeral or
memorial services, and their spirits hovered for
years unable to pass onto heaven. Then on April
10, 1970, the prefectural Branch of the
Organization of Korean Residents in Japan
erected this memorial in this corner of Hiroshima,
the city of Peace. This memorial was erected in
the hope that the souls of our compatriots, brought
to misery through forces, will be able to rest in
peace. It is also an expression of our demand
than the A-bomb tragedy will never be repeated.
We pray, of course, for the solace of these lost
souls longing for their homelands, but killed on
foreign soil. However, we also pray that the
plight of Korean survivors, poorly understood
even today, will emerge into public awareness
and that reasonable assistance for these survivors
will be provided immediately. A Memorial
service for the Korean victims of the bomb is held
here every year on August fifth.26)
Yoneyama limits her discussion regarding hibaku-
sha of non-Japanese citizenship to Koreans in Japan.
Unfortunately, by failing to acknowledge the existence
of Japanese American, Japanese Brazillian, Taiwanese,
and other hibakusha she misses an important opportu-
nity to deepen her critique regarding race, nation, and
citizenship within the Hiroshima narrative.
In her biographical work investigating the life of
Japanese American artist Isamu Noguchi, Masayo
Duus27) details a controversy beginning in 1951when
Noguchi was invited to visit Hiroshima by Kenzo
Tange, a prominent Japanese architect commissioned
to design the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. Tange
had intended for Noguchi to design the parkʼs central
cenotaph that would house the names of the hibakusha.
Following a meeting with Tange and the then
Hiroshima Mayor Hamai, Noguchi eagerly volun-
teered for the project. After laborious deliberation
concerning the symbolism as well as ongoing
consultation with Tange, he completed his design in
March of the following year. Shortly thereafter,
however, Noguchi received notice from the mayor that
his design had been rejected. According to an article
put out by Peace Seeds in collaboration with
Hiroshimaʼs Chugoku newspaper, “the committee
charged with the reconstruction plans for the city
opposed Mr. Noguchiʼs participation.”28) The City
Construction Committee however did not hesitate to
approve a design that Tange put together in a hasty
four days. In a letter written to his friend John Collier,
Noguchi describes his bewilderment at the sudden and
unexpected rejection. The only explanation Tange
could offer as to why it had been rejected was “perhaps
because I (Noguchi) was an American.” Commenting
on this Noguchi writes, “It was my one most
disagreeable experience in Japan.”29)
Noguchiʼs story corroborates Doiʼs critique on the
nationalisms in Hiroshima discourse. Just as
Noguchiʼs design for the cenotaph was rejected and
politically excluded from the memory of the bomb, so
too have been Japanese American, Brazilian, Korean,
and Taiwanese hibakusha,30) with material implica-
tions much more insidious to the health and socio-
political lives of its sufferers than a rejection of their
art work.
The exclusion of Koreans, Nikkei, and other so-
called foreigners in Hiroshimaʼs commemorative space
allows for a distortion of history; it is what sanctions
the nationalistic myth of Japan=victim. Although
Japan exploited this frame for its own benefit, in the
global arena it must also be understood within the
context of orientalist racism. Andrea Smithʼs develop-
ment of Saidʼs logic of orientalism and its pairing with
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the anchor of war is particularly applicable here
because of the important ways it connects race, gender
and war.31) Under an essentialist logic, Japanʼs image
shifts overnight from one of empiric and brutal
aggressor to that of the occupied weak. This
orientalist logic is clearly present in the image of Japan
represented in American newspapers following the
dropping of the atomic bomb and Japanʼs subsequent
surrender, in which a “short occupation of Japan is
predicted” on the grounds of the Japanese people being
“co-operative” “friendly” “very helpful” and well
“disciplined.”32) In this way, Japanʼs misogynist and
criminal violence against women during the war is
easily eschewed under the orientalist logic in which
Japan itself is feminized and castrated of its aggressor
image.
Japanʼs nationalism was not erased, forgiven and
then forgotten, its imperialism was given a colonial
amnesiatic veil for its defeat in the war, the subsequent
US-Japan Cold War alliance and security treaties.
Yoneyama exposes one particular disturbing example
of how Japanʼs imperialism was reappropriated for the
neo-national Peace Industrial Complex, she details
how Tangeʼs design for the Hiroshima Peace Park is
actually a modified version of a design previously
intended to celebrate the Japanese empire articulated in
the concept of “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity.”33)
Atomic Bomb=Saved Lives=End War :
Tracing the American Mythology
If the formula for remembering in Japan has been
Atomic Bomb=Peace=Anti-war, and imparts a myth of
national victimhood, then the formula in the United
States could be written as Atomic Bomb=Saved
Lives=End War and propagates an image of national
heroism. Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell argue
that in order to justify the unprecedented deaths and
injuries of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians
resulting from the bombings, the atomic bomb in the
American narrative had to be “understood as a
reflection of dominant military power and at the same
time consistent with American decency and concern
for human life.”34) Thus, work setting the stage for the
official narrative of the bomb was tediously crafted and
begun many months prior to the act of dropping the
bomb, the bulk of its shape owed to Leslie R. Groves,
director of the Manhattan Project, and Secretary of
War Henry L. Stimson.35)
In fact, the entire story of the atomic bomb told from
America appeared to unfold like a well-rehearsed
theatre production featuring some of Americaʼs best
actors. Notably, the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist
William L. Laurence, handpicked by Groves, becomes
the unofficial mouth of the War Department.
Laurenceʼs articles glorify the science of the bomb and
atomic energy36) and they saturated the American
Press. Lifton and Mitchell argue that the Hiroshima
narrative was written over the absolute “suppression of
evidence (including articles, photographs, and film
footage) that showed the human consequences of the
Hiroshima bomb,” “shielding Americans both from
the human effects of the bomb and its implications for
the future.”37) They argue that it is through the
strategic execution of propaganda and concealment
that President Trumanʼs justification : “We saved a
half a million American lives” became indoctrinated
into American culture and memory.
Under this policy of suppression, a strict censorship
and media dictatorship regarding the bomb was
enforced ; almost all information regarding the bomb
in the American press had been generated by the War
Department. Although some descriptions of the
destruction did manage to sneak into American
national view from time to time, for example when
some media channels picked up on a Tokyo radio
broadcast that referred to Hiroshima as “a city of the
dead” describing the victims as “bloated and scorched-
such an awesome sight-their legs and bodies stripped
of clothes and burned with a huge blister. . .” Such
reports, however, were quickly countered and dis-
counted as Japanese war propaganda.38) Following the
warʼs end, foreign correspondents were not allowed to
enter Hiroshima or Nagasaki, much less report on their
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nuclear devastation. Japanese newspapers also were
required to submit material to a censorship board for
review before it could be published.39) Scientists as
well were required to submit their findings to the
censorship board for review. This censorship, com-
bined with myths dispersed by the war department was
necessary, not only as a justification of the use of the
bomb, but also as an offensive strategy to curb fears
about the danger of radiation in America.
In fact, the American public in general and quite a
number of specific populations in particular had much
cause to be alarmed about the danger of radiation. In
the 1980ʼs, it was estimated that one million
Americans had been exposed to high levels of radiation
through nuclear explosions or fallout. Significantly,
native populations have been disproportionately
affected by the nuclear industries extractive practices.
Diana Ortiz of the Indian Health and Radiation Project
in New Mexico said that “much of the uranium mined
in the U.S is found on or near Indian land where native
miners have died of cancer or are suffering from
radiation -related illnesses.”40) The American narra-
tive, when deconstructed in this way is a grotesque
example of the fundamental strategies employed in the
logics outlined by Andrea Smith in her important
essay : “Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of
White Supremacy.”41)
The Hiroshima Maidens
The Hiroshima Maidens were a group of twenty-
five young, Japanese female hibakusha brought to the
United States in 1955 to undergo reconstructive
surgery for injuries and mutilations incurred as a result
of the US bombing of Hiroshima.42) Rodney Barkerʼs
book, Hiroshima Maidens, chronicles many of the
details of the Hiroshima Maidens Project illuminating
its evolution into an American mission. Although it
traces important characters and important develop-
ments in its historiography, Barkerʼs account, regretta-
bly, also becomes accomplice to the gendered
paternalism at the core of the project. Conversely, it is
precisely the naïve paternalism that makes Barkerʼs
book an invaluable tool for examining the discursive
practices of postwar America.
The introductory descriptor of the hibakusha in
Barkerʼs book is just one of many red flags that appear.
Barkerʼs tale originates with a Japanese Methodist
minister, Kiyoshi Tanimoto, expressing feelings of
remorse for his inability to help “his girls” :
The thinly clad, young schoolgirls were the
unluckiest. In a fraction of a second their lives
took a tragic turn. Many had witnessed the
atomic flash with their faces lifted, and the intense
heat charred exposed flesh and left scars that
wrenched their facial features into grotesquely
symbolic expressions. One could not smile
because the contractions tugged her lips over her
teeth into a permanent snarl. Another had her
right eyelid seared away; unprotected, the eye
watered steadily as though possessed with a grief
of its very own.43)
Barkerʼs tragically poetic, even pornographic objectifi-
cation of the hibakusha sets the tone for the
subjugation of all that is Japanese in service of
American diplomatic orientalist imagery, or as
Caroline Chung Simpson put it “the logic of US
masculinized domination of the feminized east.”44)
Simpson unpacks the oriental and sexual logics
attached to the Hiroshima Maidens Project in the
service of a hetero-normative 1950ʼs white citizenship
obsessed with domesticity.45) By arguing that the
Hiroshima Maidens Project offered a narrative in
which “the white American mother and the idealized
American home she produced were portrayed as the
solutions both to the problem of damaged femininity
and to the lingering ethical doubts about American
democracy caused by the devastating effects of the
atomic bombs,”46) Simpson highlights the orientalist
logics strategically used to enhance the heroism, moral
and intellectual dominance of America by focusing
attention on the philanthropy and goodness of the
Crystal UCHINO134
white-hetero citizens in gendered ways.
In addition to this sexual and exotic “other”ing of
the hibakusha, Barkerʼs book is host to a slew of other
orientalist logics complicit with Americaʼs bomb
myth. Throughout the book Japan was constructed,
however unintentionally, as intellectually and morally
inferior. Barkerʼs explanation that after several years
of campaigning and plastic surgeries inside of Japan, it
was decided that the only hope for the project was to
move it to the United States because it was believed
that the medical advancement of America was the only
thing that might be able to ameliorate the suffering of
the hibakusha. Turning the Hiroshima Maidens
Project into an American mission was also used to
highlight the magnanimity of America in comparison
to Japan.
The saga of the Reverend Tanimotoʼs struggle to
obtain medical help for his group of girls from
within the community of Hiroshima is a shameful
episode of neglect. . . When he approached
public officials, he found that they were so intent
on establishing a new identity for Hiroshima as a
“Peace City” and placing it on the world map,
that they were more interested in constructing
monuments and memorials to the dead than in
helping the suffering of thousands who still
lived.47)
The Hiroshima Maidenʼs Project, in this way gave new
structure to Americaʼs mythology. In this reading of
history, it seems that Japan and not the US was
responsible for the suffering resulting from the atomic
bomb and the project came to symbolize American
generosity and friendship.
The story of disfigured young Japanese women
willingly rehabilitated by white American fami-
lies did much both to ameliorate Americansʼ guilt
about the use of the bomb and to enshrine further
the 1950ʼs American home as a model of comfort
and security available to all.48)
An important observation made by Japanese American
feminist scholars is the instrumental role that two
Japanese American women, Helen Yokoyama and
Mary (Yuri) Kochiyama played in the successes of the
Hiroshima Maidens Project. Simpson for example
notes that the coordinating work and bilingual skills of
Yokoyama and Kochiyama were absolutely vital to the
functions of the project. Their role, however, has been
all but written out of a history preferring to cast its
characters as white mothers and Japanese daughters.49)
Bridging Myths
In applying Bruce Lincolnʼs discussion on the
central role of force in discourse, it is possible to
conclude that the forces are being applied in the same
general direction. In both cases, strategic practices,
operating within an orientalist framework, of remem-
bering and forgetting the atomic bomb have been
essential to the postwar articulation of United States
and Japanese exceptionalism, while distracting from
the all too onerous realities. Essentially, equating the
bomb with peace and with the saving of lives is the
same preposterous myth used to justify two different
stories. The reality of the bomb is that it killed people
and destroyed lives. I do not debate whether the
dropping of the bomb was ethical or not, but to have an
event which devastated two cities and took the lives of
hundreds of thousands of non-combatants be remem-
bered as leading to world peace and saving lives is
insulting, particularly when we consider that wars
employing nuclear weapons continue to plague global
politics.
Lincoln tells us that “Myth has the task of giving a
historical intention a natural justification, and making
contingency appear eternal.”50) In the construction of
these two seemingly separate mythologies, each
country is able to present a positive image, one that
simultaneously obscured the US-Japan Cold War
alliance as well as the contradictory nature of the US
nuclear umbrella under Article 9 of Japanʼs
Constitution.51) Reading these two narratives side by
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side importantly reveals how history is constructed
over multiple borders. Moreover, interrogation of
these myths reveals that race is a crucial category for
understanding the complexity of the present situation
as a product of historical contingencies, echoing Elena
Tajima Creefʼs contention that “repressions of histori-
cal memory is never accidental, but often shaped by
the culture of racism.”52) By exposing the logics of
white supremacy in the silences written into these
myths, it advances both the claim that race is a political
category, and as Joel Olsen has argued that American
democracy and racial oppression have always been
mutually constitutive.53)
Japanese American 1945 perspective on
dropping of the Atomic Bomb
In the shadows of the narratives being constructed
by the United States and Japan, Japanese Americans
held their own unique and complex views on the
dropping of the atomic bombs which varied depending
on geo-political factors, for example, whether or not
they had family in Hiroshima, or if they had served in
the military during the time of the bombing, and then
of course if they themselves had been in Hiroshima and
survived the bombing.54) These views on the atomic
bomb are not well documented. Mainland Japanese
American sentiments regarding the bomb have
appeared in some of the literature on Japanese
American internment during World War II, but for the
most part there remains a critical lack of primary
sources providing insight into Japanese American
perspectives on the bombings in 1945. Furthermore,
as historians such as Brian Hayashi have noted,
Japanese Americans were not a homogenous group,
but instead “divided by class, immigration status,
occupation, prefectural origins regionalism, and gender
fissures”55) making it even more difficult to generalize
about Japanese American responses to the atomic
bomb. Individual responses themselves were, in fact
complicated. For example Mary Matsuda Gruenwald
in her book Looking like the Enemy wrote :
When I saw the pictures of Japanese people
burned and charred by the atomic blast, I was
heartbroken for them. I was an American by
birth, but at that moment, I was Japanese. . . My
tears were a mix of relief and anguish. Even
though part of me was glad the United States won
the war, the Japanese part of me was speechless
with grief and horror.56)
Michi Nishiura Weglyn in her book Years of Infamy :
The Untold Story of Americaʼs Concentration Camps
writes that, “nearly a third of the Japanese American
immigrants incarcerated at Tule Lake had come from
Hiroshima.” For them news about the atomic bomb
was seen as the “final nightmare stage in the sequence
of injustices.”57) “Most Nikkei were shocked and
confused, many relieved yet saddened, while some
were completely devastated.”58) One thing that we do
know is that many in the camps immediately contacted
appointed personnel to find out about the welfare of
their family and friends in Hiroshima.59) Mitsue
Matsui, remembering the atomic bomb says, “that was
devastating, it was a shock. . . it really shocked me. I
knew then and there that some of my relatives had
died. And they did actually.”60) Yasashi Ichikawa
said, “It was very sad. . . a friend of mine died in
Nagasaki. Because of the atomic bomb. She was a
school teacher.”61)
Many Japanese Americans with family members or
friends in the atomic-stricken cities did not learn of
their fate until months or even years later. A number
of them returned to Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the
war, and it was only then that the effects of the bomb
became tangible.62) Kay Matsuoka discusses what it
was like for her family receiving news of the bombing
of Hiroshima and their reaction :
Well, they didnʼt know who got killed or anything
until after all this passed and the letters started
coming. And then we found out that different
ones of our relatives, how they had perished in
that atom bomb. And ʼcourse, when we went
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back in (1967) to visit them for the first time,
then our uncleʼs only daughter, and then like my
side, I had one uncle that was an artist, and he was
teaching art in school, and they had all perished in
this atom bomb.63)
Harry Fukuhara served as a colonel in the US Military
Intelligence Service during WWII. Fukuhara reflect-
ing back to the time when he heard news of the
bombing of Hiroshima says he felt a mixture of “shock
and relief.” “Shock” because he was from Hiroshima
and still had family (his mother and three brothers)
living there. “Relief” because Japanʼs surrender
meant that he would not have to participate in a future
Allied invasion. After the bombing Fukuhara worried
about his family and became extremely depressed,
“my thinking degraded to the point that I blamed
myself-that they had died because I had volunteered to
fight against them.”64) Fukuhara was able to reunite
with his family in Hiroshima; most had survived the
initial bombing, however, his brother died within the
year of atomic bomb-related injury. Fukuhara, in this
memoir, articulates something that I think could be
applicable to all Japanese Americans grappling with
the memory of the atomic bomb, he says “for years, by
virtue of a silent mutual agreement, we avoided talking
about what happened to our family in Hiroshima. . . I
believe that talking about it now with a purpose, was
the medicine I needed.”65)
I Come From There : Obliterated Homeland,
Temporality in the Japanese Diaspora
The concept of homeland has been a central theme
in many studies within the fields of immigration,
diaspora and race studies. Gloria Anzaldua in her
poem “Borderlands” expresses well the feeling of
living in a unsettled temporality “caught in the
crossfire between camps, while carrying all five races
on your back not knowing which side to turn to, run
from ; . . . You are at home, a stranger.”66)
The longing for a return to oneʼs homeland and the
commitment to the maintenance of oneʼs homeland has
been generally used to describe some aspects of
diasporic experiences.67) Wanni Anderson and Robert
Lee, in their book Displacements and Diasporas :
Asians in the Americas contend, “Immigrant commun-
ities are affected by both the lived and the imagined
notion of ʻhome.ʼ”68) Homeland might be a contested
notion with multiple meanings, but I argue that
whether recent immigrants, original inhabitants, or
individuals who found their settlement in the U. S.
somewhere in between, Japanese American subjectiv-
ity in the pre-war years was always situated in relation
to “home,” and this sense of home was heavily
burdened by the notion of “loyalty.”
Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston describes what grappling
with the news of the atomic bomb was like for
Japanese Americans living inside Americaʼs concen-
tration camps. She writes :
All over America people were dancing in the
streets. I suppose there was some rejoicing at
Manzanar too. At least we were no longer the
enemy. But the Atomic bomb if anything just
sharpened our worry. . . I still see Papa sitting on
our steps for long hours, smoking cigarettes in his
ivory holder, staring into the mountains he went
to with his eyes whenever he needed sustenance.
Here he sat, a man with no prospects, perhaps
now without even a family in Japan to confirm his
own history. . .69)
In Houstonʼs account, it is her father who is the subject
of direct connection to the consequence of the atomic
bomb, yet this story and the one that follows provides a
place to secure the multi-generational significance of
the atomic bomb. Kay Matsuokaʼs reflection on her
fatherʼs response to receiving news about the bomb
also advances the argument that pre-war Japanese
American history must be understood using a
transnational frame, and furthermore, that it is
important to question pre-war distinctions in identity
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between Japanese Immigrants and Japanese, she
writes :
Well, it was word of mouth. We didnʼt have any
radio or anything like that. And at that time my
father, [Laughs] he says, “Thatʼs just an old
rumor.“ He says, “That canʼt be.“ . . . You know
this was generally, you know, the Isseis still hung
on to. They were in America, and they were in
camp and everything, but they still had way in the
back of their mind they were pulling for Japan,
that Japan has never lost a war.70)
World War II was a turning point in Japanese
American identity for many reasons. Before the war
many Japanese Americans maintained close ties to
Japan. Many in fact supported Japanʼs war effort and
empire expansion. This point has been clarified by
Lon Kurashige who has argued that JACLers
[Japanese American Citizens League] did not see
severing ties with Japan as a requisite for proving
loyalty to the United States. He says :
Despite Americaʼs opposition to Japanese imperi-
alism, they sided with their parents, who, like
most expatriates, reveled in the military victories
of their homeland. The formal declaration of the
second Sino-Japanese war in 1937 heightened ties
to the motherland, as both generations sent
money, supplies, and well wishes to Japanese
soldiers.71)
Furthermore, it has been estimated that 30, 000
Japanese-Americans in Japan at the start of the war
actually joined the Japanese war effort, hundreds of
them even enlisted and fought in the Japanese army.72)
Assimilation, “Americanization” and accommoda-
tion was frequently a focal point of debate among
Nikkei in early Japanese America.73) The meaning of
“Americanization,” functioning as accommodation or
as supremacy, has also been a subject of contention.
Fuminori Minamikawa, for example, has argued that
an understanding of Nikkei Japanese-ness should not
be read as a simple relationship to culture inherited
from the homeland. He develops this argument by
saying that pre-war “Americanization” was actually a
racial project premised on the idea that Japan and
Japanese Americans were “civilized,” and superior,
and thus could become “white” American citizens.74)
Throughout the early debates about whether Japanese
Americans should give up their Japanese-ness to
become American, and regardless of the correct
interpretation of Nikkei Japanese-ness, I argue that
there remained a strong connection to Japan as a
homeland. This is evidenced in the transnational flow
of people and money back and forth between Japan and
America in the pre-war years. 1927 remittances to
Hiroshima prefecture alone, amounted to 3, 179, 518
yen,75) a sizable sum when you consider that in 1927
two yen was equal to approximately one US dollar.76)
Given Japanese Americanʼs strong historical ties to
Hiroshima, the dropping of the atomic bomb seems to
be an important and yet dramatically underemphasized
turning point in Japanese American history. Not only
did the dropping of the bomb solidify Japanʼs defeat,
but for those in the concentration camps, especially
those who emigrated from Hiroshima, who thought
they might return to Japan after the war to escape racist
and discriminatory practices in America or who held
on to a notion of Japan as homeland, the bomb changed
all of that; it arguably severed dreams of returning to a
homeland and made assimilation the only viable
action.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to clarify the politics and
pluralities of atomic bomb memory and repression.
By focusing the discussion on silences and shadows in
the Japanese and American national narratives, I have
tried to illuminate the paradoxes of racism operating on
both local and transnational levels in the construction
of the atomic myths : Atomic Bomb=Peace=Anti-war
constructed in Japan ; and Atomic Bomb=Saved
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Lives=End War in America. Employing Japanese
American perspectives to interrogate atomic narratives
across the Pacific has exposed the orientalism in the
construction of the Peace Industrial Complex. It has
also raised important questions regarding the signifi-
cance of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki to Japanese American history. In addition to
what I have discussed in this article, I believe Japanese
American reckoning with the bomb will reveal still
other important gaps in our understanding of the
subjectivities, moments of inter-ethnic and transnation-
al solidarities, as well as important moments of critical
introspection in Japanese American history.
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